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A LINE IN THE SAND: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS*
Melissa L. Koehnt
Although our panel is technically entitled "Criminal Law," I want to spend
my time talking about habeas corpus. While the writ of habeas corpus is a civil
remedy, the Supreme Court's current cases tell us a great deal about the Court's
view of federalism, and federalism is increasingly becoming a key issue in all
areas of American government, including criminal law.' The writ of habeas
corpus is also inextricably linked to criminal law and the process through which
we operate our criminal courts.
For the last two decades, the Great Writ has been under assault by both
courts and politicians. Politicians, always anxious to rally votes, have latched
onto the public's increasing concern about crime. Taking advantage of that
concern, they encourage the public to view the writ of habeas corpus as the
enemy - as the tool through which liberal dupes release vast hordes of violent
criminals back into the general public. The courts, on the other hand, have
focused on concerns of their own; increasingly overwhelmed with habeas peti-
tions, they have begun retrenching the availability of the writ. Last year, Con-
gress and the President jumped on the retrenchment bandwagon with the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.2
Is there an end in sight to this retrenchment process? Or will it continue
until all vestiges of the right to habeas have been eviscerated? As I will discuss,
I think an end has come to court initiated reform, at least as far as first petitions
are concerned. The four habeas opinions handed down by the Supreme Court in
the 1995-96 term tell us where the Court has drawn the line in the retrenchment
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1995 Supreme
Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, December 6, 1996.
t Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D, University of Michigan 1992; B.A.,
Trinity University 1989.
1. I find it very interesting that the trend in criminal law is exactly the opposite of the trend in almost
every other area. With the election of the Republicans in 1994 and the promulgation of their Contract with
America, the watchword (or more accurately, "watch phrase") has become less federal power, and more state
power. When it comes to criminal law, however, the idea seems to be the more federal law on the subject, the
better.
2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amend-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 2244).
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process. As these cases show, the Court will not accept any additional restric-
tions on first petitions. The Court has taken a more ambiguous position, howev-
er, with respect to second and successive petitions. Unfortunately, Congress'
entry into the reform arena has gone a great deal farther than the Supreme
Court was willing to go. In the hands of the Supreme Court, habeas ceased to
be a strong, vital remedy, but it was still a remedy. In the hands of Congress,
habeas has probably ceased to exist altogether.
Before turning to the opinions from last term, let me give you a brief
history of the writ. Although the writ of habeas corpus has existed since the
inception of this country, it was originally available only to prisoners of the
federal government.3 Over the last one hundred years, however, the availability
of the Great Writ has vastly expanded. The first step in this expansion occurred
after the Civil War, when Congress expanded the availability of the writ to
include prisoners of state governments.4 The next key steps occurred in the first
half of this century, when most of the provisions in the Bill of Rights were
extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.' These steps al-
lowed the number of habeas petitions to expand exponentially.6 Not only could
state prisoners now petition for the writ, the grounds available to them had
greatly increased.
Approximately two decades ago, the Supreme Court started a pattern of
retrenching the availability of habeas writs, particularly through creating very
technical procedures for the petitions.' Over the last few years, however, we
have seen the Supreme Court drawing a line and saying, in effect, "This is far
enough. We have retrenched it as far as we are going to, and we think we have
reached the appropriate balance."8 This trend continued in the 1995-96 term.
THOMPSON V. KEOHANE
Taking the cases in the order the Supreme Court decided them, the firsthabeas decision last term was Thompson v. Keohane,9 which the Court decided
in November 1995. The case began with the discovery of a woman's murdered
body. The body turned out to be that of Thompson's wife, and suspicion
promptly focused on him. Alaskan state troopers asked Thompson to come to
the station on the pretext of identifying his wife's belongings.'0 The troopers
used the opportunity to question him, and during the questioning, Thompson
3. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 785 (2d ed. 1994) (construing Reconstruction Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255)).
4. See id. at 786 (construing Reconstruction Act of Feb. 5, 1867, Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255)).
5. See id. at 787.
6. See id. at 787-88.
7. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995); McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994).
9. 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995).
10. See id. at 460-61.
[Vol. 32:389
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confessed to the murder. His confession was used against him at trial." In his
habeas proceeding, Thompson argued that his confession should not have been
admitted at trial because the state troopers did not read him his Miranda rights
prior to the interrogation.'2 Resolution of this argument rested on whether
Thompson was "in custody" at the time of his confession; Miranda warnings
are required only when a suspect is interrogated while in police custody.'3
As required by the exhaustion rules,'" Thompson had raised this issue
during his state proceedings, and the Alaskan courts ruled that he was not "in
custody" for purposes of Miranda.'5 Once Thompson initiated his habeas pro-
ceedings, the federal courts faced the issue of whether the decision of the Alas-
kan courts was entitled to deference. 6 All nine justices on the Supreme Court
agreed that the issue of whether a suspect is "in custody" is a mixed question of
law and fact.'7 Seven justices agreed that "in custody" determinations qualify
for independent review and that no presumption of correctness should be given
to the state decision on this issue.'8
Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court and spoke for all seven
justices in the majority.'9 The opinion promulgates a two-part test for deter-
mining whether a state court decision should be given a presumption of correct-
ness. According to the opinion, the first question a court should ask is whether
the issue is a basic primary or historical fact, as these are the types of issues "to
which the statutory presumption of correctness dominantly relates."'2 In other
words, in the context of this case, things such as where the suspect was ques-
tioned, how long he was questioned, the conditions of the questioning, whether
he was arrested, etc.-all those sorts of questions are ones of basic primary fact.
The federal courts must give a presumption of correctness to state court find-
ings on these types of issues.2 '
Answering "no, this issue was not a basic primary or historical fact," does
not, however, end the inquiry. One more question must be asked: "Does the
resolution of the issue depend heavily on the trial court's appraisal of witness
credibility and demeanor?" In other words, if this is the type of determina-
tion for which an appellate court would give great deference to a trial judge
because the trial judge was essentially a witness to the event, then it also de-
serves a presumption of correctness in a habeas proceeding.' Examples of
I I. See id. at 461-62.
12. See id. at 462.
13. See id. at 462-63 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
14. Absent unusual circumstances, the only issues cognizable in habeas are ones which were properly
presented to all appropriate levels of the state court.
15. See Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 461-62.
16. See id. at 460.
17. See id. at 460, 467-68.
18. See id. at 460.
19. See id. Justice Ginsburg's opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Breyer.
20. See id. at 464.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 465.
23. See id. at 464-65.
19971
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issues that qualify under this provision are the defendant's competency to stand
trial and challenges to juror impartiality.24 The decision emphasizes that these
are matters that actually occurred in the courtroom, and thus the trial judge had
knowledge of them that could not be reproduced on the record.' There is no
way, then, that a federal court could be in an equal or better position to decide
the issue than the state court. Since the "in custody" determination in Thompson
revolved around matters that occurred at the police station, and the trial judge's
only knowledge was the witnesses' testimony, which was reproduced in the
record,'s the state court determination that Thompson was not "in custody" at
the time of his confession did not deserve a presumption of correctness.27 The
federal courts are thus entitled to review this issue de novo.'
Justice Thomas wrote the dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist.29 As I mentioned earlier, the dissenters agreed that the "in
custody" question was a mixed question of law and fact.3" They disagreed,
however, as to the appropriate test for determining whether a mixed question
deserves a presumption of correctness' According to the dissenters, what we
need to look at is whether "as a matter of the sound administration of justice"
the state court judge is in a better position to decide the issue. 2 In this case
(and the reasoning will probably apply to almost every mixed question of law
and fact), Thomas said that the state court was in a better position, so its deter-
mination should have been given a presumption of correctness.3
As I alluded to earlier, the theme of my talk is that the Supreme Court's
recent habeas cases are drawing a line-the Court is saying it will retrench this
far and no farther. Thompson is a significant case in establishing this theme. We
have seven justices who declared that questions of law are reserved for federal
judges in habeas proceedings. While that in and of itself is not a surprise, what
was encouraging to see was the majority's position on mixed questions. When
it comes to these types of determinations, federal courts will presume that the
state court's resolution of the basic, primary factual issues are correct. When it
comes to the ultimate legal questions of whether these facts amount to "in cus-
24. See id. at 464.
25. See id. at 465.
26. See id. at 465.
27. See id. at 465-66.
28. See id. at 466-67.
29. See id. at 467 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
30. See id. at 467-68.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 468.
33. See id. at 468. "The state trial judge is, in my estimation, the best-positioned judicial actor to decide
the relatively straightforward and fact-laden question of Miranda custody.... In making the custody determi-
nation, the state trial judge must consider a complex of diverse and case-specific factors in an effort to gain
an overall sense of the defendant's situation at the time of the interrogation.... Assessments of credibility
and demeanor are crucial to the ultimate determination, for the trial judge will often have to weigh conflicting
accounts of what transpired. The trial judge is also likely to draw inferences, which are similarly entitled to
deference, from 'physical or documentaryevidence or... other facts.' ... The Miranda custody inquiry is
thus often a matter of 'shades and degrees' . . . that requires the state trial judge to make any number of 'fact-
intensive, close calls"'. Id.
[Vol. 32:389
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tody," however, the federal courts will review the issue de novo. In other
words, the federal courts are keeping a meaningful role for themselves in deter-
mining whether a writ of habeas should be issued; they will not cede too much
of the key decision-making authority to the state courts.
LONCHAR V. THOMAS
The Supreme Court's next habeas decision, Lonchar v. Thomas,' was
decided in April 1996. Lonchar, like Thompson, is a somewhat promising deci-
sion from the Court. 5 In Lonchar, we have a situation where Mr. Lonchar did
not file a habeas petition until very, very shortly before his scheduled execu-
tion?6 Several other petitions had been filed on his behalf by his brother and
sister, but those had eventually been dismissed 7 This was his first federal ha-
beas petition."
The state filed a response with the district court essentially saying, "look,
this is unreasonable delay. This was an eleventh hour *petition. District Judge,
you should not stay this execution and you should dismiss this petition based
on 'Lonchar's inequitable conduct' in waiting almost six years, and until the
last minute, to file a federal habeas petition."39 The district judge refused to
dismiss the petition, holding that it did not meet the standard for dismissal set
out in Rule 9.' For those of you who do not practice in this area, a special set
of rules supplements the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for habeas cases.
These rules are called, cleverly enough, the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts. Rule 9(a) of the habeas rules ad-
dresses late petitions and sets out a standard for dismissing delayed petitions."
The district court held that Lonchar's petition did not meet these standards and
refused to consider any other standard
The state appealed the stay to the circuit court, which reversed the district
court.43 According to the Eleventh Circuit, the district court erred in focusing
solely on Rule 9(a).' The appellate court ruled that the lower court should
34. 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996).
35. I say "promising" because I am of the school that believes that habeas is a very important remedy
and that it is crucial for it to continue to fill that role.
36. See Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1296.
37. See id. at 1295-96.
38. See id. at 1296.
39. See id. at 1296.
40. See id. (citing R. GOvERNING § 2254 CAsEs IN U.S. D. CT. 9).
41. "Delayed petitions. A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the respondent
is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the peti-
tioner shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reason-
able diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred." R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES IN
U.S. D. Cr. 9(a).
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have considered equitable reasons outside of Rule 9, and remanded with direc-
tions that the district court dismiss both the stay and the petition.4
Lonchar then appealed to the Supreme Court. The issue before the Court
was whether a federal court could dismiss a first federal habeas petition for
"serious delay" based on equitable considerations not embodied in statutes,
rules, or prior precedents.' I have chosen to refer to Lonchar as a five-four
decision. If you look just at the judgment, however, the Court unanimously
agreed to vacate the Eleventh Circuit's decision and remand for further proceed-
ings. When you look at why the justices vacated the opinion and what they
wanted to happen on remand, however, the justices split five to four.
The five justices in the majority47 held that federal courts cannot properly
dismiss a first habeas petition for special reasons that are not embodied within
the framework of the existing rules.' What does this mean in plain English?
Basically, the Court held that a test existed for dismissing late habeas petitions.
And since a test already existed, federal courts can't run around making up
alternative tests or using ad hoc reasons instead of applying the Rule 9 test.
Although Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court is sort of a mish-mash, it
essentially offers two reasons to support its conclusion. First up is the ever
pervasive legal history argument. According to the opinion, history reflects the
fact that very specific traditions have developed to govern when habeas peti-
tions should be granted and when they should be denied.49 According to these
traditions, habeas petitions should be dismissed only on the basis of formal
rules - that is, rules embodied in cases, statutes, or in the federal rules."0 Ac-
cording to the majority, courts have not and should not dismiss habeas petitions
for any special ad hoc reasons." In other words, the opinion does not dispute
that the writ of habeas corpus is an equitable remedy, but an equitable remedy
does not mean a remedy without standards5
Secondly, and building on the historical argument, the opinion noted that
judicial opinions, federal statutes, and the federal habeas rules all establish
standards for a court to use in deciding whether to grant a habeas petition. 3
These rules give judges a great deal of discretion, and judges can exercise their
discretion within the boundaries of the rules. They may not, however, go out-
side the boundaries of the rules. 4 The opinion emphasizes that this is especial-
ly true when an existing rule addresses the exact issue before the court.5
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1295. The majority consisted of Justices Breyer writing for himself and Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg.




52. See id. at 1298-99.
53. See id. at 1298.
54. See id. at 1298-99.
55. See id. at 1299-1300.
[Vol. 32:389
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In the present case, the issue was whether Lonchar's petition should be
dismissed for unreasonable delay. 6 Rule 9(a) explicitly discusses this issue and
provides guidelines for courts faced with this question. 7 If you look at the
notes after that rule, said Justice Breyer, you see that many equitable conditions
and considerations were thought of and taken into account by the drafters of the
habeas rules when they formulated the guidelines in Rule 9(a)."5 Therefore, it
would be improper for a federal court to ignore those guidelines and go outside
the boundaries they establish5 9
The concurring opinion was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined
by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. ° These four agreed with the majori-
ty that Rule 9(a) provides the only grounds for dismissing the petition.61 They
further agreed that one of the reasons the case should be remanded was the
Eleventh Circuit's failure to properly consider this rule.62 The main difference
between the concurring justices and the majority centers around something the
majority dismissed as a basic preliminary issue.63 Remember the procedural
posture of this case - the decision being appealed was the circuit court's hold-
ing that the district court erred in granting the stay of execution.m The lower
court had not issued a decision on the merits of the petitiones The question
before the Court was what standards it should use in reviewing that stay.'
The majority thought the appropriate standard for review, and the correct
procedure for making its decision, would be to see whether the petition had
merit.67 If so, then the stay was appropriate because the federal courts should
not allow an execution to moot a potentially meritorious petition6 On this
basis, the majority dove right into the issue of whether Lonchar's petition was
properly dismissed as a delayed petition.69
The concurrence disagreed with this approach. Instead, the concurrers
wanted to give judges more leeway in deciding whether or not to stay an exe-
cution." According to the four concurring justices, it is very appropriate for
56. See id. at 1300.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 1301.
60. See id. at 1304 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
61. See id. at 1307.
62. See id. The court of appeals had instead focused its decision, and based its conclusion that the peti-
tion should be dismissed, on Rule 9(b), which deals with abuse of the writ. See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concur-
ring). The appellate court concluded that Lonchar had abused the writ, largely on the basis of the prior habeas
petition that had been filed on his behalf by his brother and sister. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 590, 592-
93 (11th Cir. 1995). The concurring justices agreed that this was the wrong basis; it was improper to hold
Lonchar responsible for what other people did on his behalf; the court should have looked only at whether
Lonchar personally had previously filed a habeas petition. See Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1307 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring).




67. See id. at 1296-97.
68. See id. at 1297.
69. See id. at 1298.
70. See id. at 1304-05 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
1997]
7
Koehn: A Line in the Sand: The Supreme Court and the Writ of Habeas Corp
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
federal judges to consider not just the merits of a petition in deciding whether
or not to issue a stay, but to also consider the eleventh hour nature of a peti-
tion' This is a very ominous sounding declaration, as it would seems to say
that a state can execute a person before a first federal habeas petition is ever
adjudicated.
The significance of Lonchar lies in the fact that five justices extensively
discussed the importance of a first federal habeas petition, in both dicta as well
as in the actual holding. Again, this advances my theme that we are seeing the
Supreme Court drawing a line as if to say "this far and no farther." Over the
last decade, the Supreme Court has erected many procedural roadblocks for
habeas petitioners, especially for those filing second or successive petitions. The
Court in Lonchar is sending a clear message that the first habeas petition is
very important, despite existing restrictions. In other words, the Court thinks it
is very important that all state prisoners who desire to file a federal habeas
corpus petition get a meaningful first opportunity to do so. After that, however,
all bets are off.
Let me tie this together by looking at McFarland v. Scott,72 a decision
from the 1993-94 term. McFarland grew out of a strange situation set up by the
federal courts in Texas. Generally, a petitioner is required to first file a petition
before he is eligible for appointment of counsel. Accordingly, petitioners often
file a pro forma petition, get an attorney appointed for them, and the attorney
then files an amended petition. A creative federal judge in Texas upset this
apple cart by dismissing a pro forma petition on the merits, and then dismissing
a later, substantive petition as an abuse of the writ.' This left petitioners in
Texas reluctant to file a pro forma petition.74 Accordingly, one petitioner first
filed a motion for appointment of counsel, so that the initial petition could be
drafted and filed by an attorney.75 The Supreme Court said that this was a per-
missible procedure; an actual petition did not have to be filed before appoint-
ment of counsel."
McFarland demonstrates how important that first federal habeas petition is
to the Supreme Court.' The Court has put many limitations on habeas peti-
tions, such as exhaustion and procedural default, but an entire set of even more
stringent restrictions apply to second and successive petitions. In McFarland,
the Court stated that it would not allow a lower federal court to gut the sub-
stance and significance of the first petition by creating additional hurdles for
first petitions." In other words, the Court refused to let a lower court render a
71. See id. at 1305-06.
72. 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994).
73. See id. at 2570 n.1.
74. See id. at 2570-71 n.1.
75. See id. at 2570.
76. See id. at 2574.




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss3/3
THE SUPREME COURT AND HABEAS CORPUS
petitioner's first shot at federal habeas meaningless by not allowing a pro forma
petition to be replaced by a substantive petition.
Lonchar continues this theme. Remember, the Eleventh Circuit wanted to
add further restrictions to first petitions by allowing, even mandating, that the
district court dismiss a first petition based on a standard other than the one
articulated by the federal rules.79 The Supreme Court refused to allow these
extra restrictions, holding that the district court correctly thought itself bound by
the standards established in the existing rules.8" In other words, the Court will
not accept further restrictions on a first petition.
GRAY V. NETHERLAND
The Supreme Court's third habeas decision last term was Gray v.
Netherland,"1 which was a very, very standard habeas case. Gray was tried and
convicted of capital murder, and the jury sentenced him to death. 2 One 6f the
primary pieces of evidence against Gray was provided by his partner in crime
who agreed to cooperate with the government and testified at trial that Gray
actually pulled the trigger and committed the murder.'
At the beginning of the trial, the prosecutor provided the defense with
notice of the evidence it intended to present during the penalty phase, should
the jury convict during the guilt phase of the trial.84 One of the issues during
the penalty phase would be whether Gray presented a risk of future dangerous-
ness. 5 To prove that he did, the prosecution planned to introduce some partic-
ular types of evidence tending to show that Gray had committed other
crimes." After the guilt phase and just before the start of the penalty stage,
however, the prosecution effectively said, "Oh, and here are a bunch of other
different kinds of evidence we are also going to introduce to show that you
committed these prior horrible murders."' The defense attorney indicated that
he was not prepared to rebut this additional evidence; he had prepared only for
the evidence disclosed at the start of trial.88 The trial judge declared that the
penalty phase would proceed, and the defense attorney acquiesced without
making a formal motion for a continuance.89 Gray was sentenced to death."
In his habeas petition, he raised the issue of lack of notice and argued that the
79. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. CL 1293, 1295 (1996).
80. See id. at 1303.
81. 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996).
82. See id. at 2078-79.







90. See id. at 2079.
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sentencing phase should not have proceeded without an opportunity for his
attorney to properly prepare.9
As in Lonchar, we have a five-four decision.93 The voting blocks were
the same with the exception of Justice O'Connor." Just as she has in numer-
ous other cases, she proved to be the swing vote here. The Gray majority opin-
ion was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.95 The majority separated Gray's allegations into
three issues:
1) Did the State violate Brady06 by failing to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence?'
2) Did the State violate Gray's Due Process rights by failing to provide
him adequate notice of the types of evidence it intended to introduce
at the sentencing phase?9" and,
3) Did the State violate Gray's Due Process rights by misleading him
about the evidence it intended to present at the sentencing phase?"
It then performed a standard habeas analysis, and concluded that
1) the Brady claims were not exhausted, and were thus procedurally de-
faulted;
2) the notice of evidence claim would require a new rule and, therefore,
was not cognizable in habeas; 0 ' and
3) it was not clear whether the misrepresentation issue was properly ex-
hausted, so that issue was remanded to the lower courts for further
proceedings."°
The dissent here is the important part. Justice Ginsburg wrote the primary
dissent and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer."°3 The theme
of Justice Ginsburg's opinion is that the right to a full and fair opportunity to
defend against the State's charges is one of the critical elements of due process
in a criminal proceeding."° According to the dissenters, Gray was not accord-
91. See id.
92. Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. CL 1293 (1996).
93. See Gray, 116 S. CL at 2074.
94. See id. at 2077.
95. See id.
96. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establishing that prosecutor must disclose material exculpa-
tory evidence to defense).
97. See Gray, 116 S. Ct. at 2080.
98. See id. at 2081.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 2080-81.
101. See id. at 2084-85.
102. See id. at 2082-83.
103. See id. at 2085. Justice Stevens also wrote a brief separate dissent to emphasize an extra point. As he
indicates, the evidence used against Gray in his sentencing phase was apparently not sufficient to support
separate charges against Gray, as none were filed. See id. Indeed, the record developed in the habeas proceed-
ing seems to indicate that the police had another suspect in the prior murders. Justice Stevens' separate dis-
sent emphasizes his concern with the poor quality of evidence that was a key item in obtaining the death
penalty against Gray. See id.
104. See id. at 2085, 2090.
[Vol. 32:39
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ed that fundamental right at his penalty phase." As the dissent notes, this is
not a new rule. "
As I indicated earlier, the significance of Lonchar lies in Justice
O'Connor's vote. In both Gray and Lonchar, we had five-four decision, with
the voting blocks identical except for Justice O'Connor."° In Lonchar, Justice
O'Connor provided the crucial fifth vote necessary to create a majority opinion
that reiterated the importance of a first habeas petition. In Gray, she also pro-
vided the fifth vote to create a majority opinion that preserved the status quo as
to first petitions. Gray demonstrates the willingness of the Court to sustain the
existing procedural scheme in habeas. It also shows the willingness of the Court
(and here I am showing my bias) to continue the cold, nit-picking, hyper-tech-
nical, divorced-from-reality trend of analysis within that procedural scheme. The
dissenters were exactly correct when they accused the majority of adopting a
divide and conquer scheme to dispose of Gray's claims. 8 Gray shows that
while first petitions are important, the Court is very comfortable holding that to
obtain a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must meet some very high procedur-
al standards. In other words, Gray shows that the Court is not willing to lower
those standards, but on the other hand, Thompson"t 9 and Lonchar"0 demon-
strate that the Court will not raise them, either.
FELKER V. TURPIN
The last decision I want to discuss today is Felker v. Turpin."' As I am
sure many of you are aware, last year President Clinton signed into law the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.12 Title I of this stat-
ute changes habeas procedures in several ways."' The Supreme Court agreed
near the end of the term to hear an expedited appeal contesting the constitu-
tionality of a portion of this new statute."'
The facts of Felker are irrelevant because the Court focused on three pro-
cedural issues and decided not to hear the merits of the petition. Before we
delve into those issues, however, let me give you a brief bit of background
about the relevant statutory provisions. As I mentioned earlier, the Supreme
Court has developed some extremely stringent regulations to govern second and
successive habeas petitions. The new statute builds on these and establishes
105. See id. at 2085, 2091-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 2091.
107. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 1304 (1996); Gray, 116 S. Ct. at 2074.
108. See Gray, 116 S. Ct. at 2090 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109. See Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995).
110. See Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1293.
111. 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
112. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amend-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 2244).
113. See id. § 101.
114. See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 1588 (1996). Four justices dissented from the Court's decision to
hear the case in an expedited manner. The actual opinion, however, was unanimous.
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some new requirements. One of the key provisions of the statute is the new
gatekeeping mechanism it creates to control second and successive petitions."'
Previously, screening for abuse of the writ was left to the district courts in the
first instance.16 Under the new statute, however, if a person wishes to file a
second or successive petition, he or she must first file a motion with the Court
of Appeals seeking permission to file the actual petition."7 The initial screen-
ing of second and successive petitions has now been given to a three judge
panel in the relevant court of appeals."' The panel's decision to grant or deny
permission to file the petition is not appealable." 9
The first issue in Felker was whether the statutory provision barring the
Supreme Court from reviewing these grants or denials unconstitutionally de-
creased the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." The Supreme Court found
that it did not, as the Court retained its powers under original jurisdiction to
hear petitions, and second petitions can be filed first in the Supreme Court.'
The petition at issue in Felker was a second petition, which raised the
issue of what standards the Supreme Court should use when reviewing the
merits of the petition. In addition to the gatekeeping mechanism, the new statute
also contains standards to be applied by a court considering a second peti-
tion." The gatekeeping mechanism did not restrict the Supreme Court, but is
the Court bound to use these standards in reviewing Felker's petition? The
Court basically ducked this issue, declaring that even if the new provisions do
not control, they certainly provide the Court with guidance to use in considering
second petitions."
The final major issue in Felker was whether the new statute unconstitution-
ally suspends the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution provides that the
government may not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, absent certain extraor-
dinary circumstances."2 The Court upheld this portion of the statute, declaring
that the primary restrictions in the statute apply only to second and successive
petitions, and the restrictions that do apply to first petitions are not much more
severe than those already created by the Court."a Accordingly, the statute
does not unconstitutionally suspend the writ of habeas."as
It is still early to predict the significance of Felker. The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 contains many far reaching provisions,
115. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 106.
116. Under existing case law and Rule 9 of the habeas rules. See discussion of Lonchar, supra text ac-
companying notes 30-65.
117. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 106(b).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2338 (1996).
121. See id. at 2338-39.
122. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 106.
123. See Felker 116 S. Ct. at 2339.
124. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspend-
ed, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
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primarily in the form of procedural revisions. Felker was our first look by the
Supreme Court at this new, controversial statute. It is surely not, however, the
last. I unfortunately do not have time to go through the provisions of the new
statute, but it is going to be very interesting to see what the courts do with it.
My thumbnail prediction at this point is rather dire; since Congress decided to
extend the writ to state prisoners, the courts will let Congress place as many
restrictions as it wants on the remedy. I hope I am wrong, as the procedural
restrictions in the new statute probably sound the death knell for habeas.
CONCLUSION
To briefly summarize, the Supreme Court's four habeas cases from the
1995-96 term tell us a great deal about the direction of court-imposed habeas
reforms. Over the last few terms, the Supreme Court has slowed the pace of
procedural reforms, at least when it comes to first petitions. While the Court
created a number of very high procedural hurdles for first petitions, it did not
render habeas a non-entity. Under the Court's reform regime, it is still possible
to succeed on a first petition for a writ of habeas, although it is almost impossi-
ble to succeed on a second or successive petition. Unfortunately, Congress
chose last year to enter into the "reform" arena and enact its own set of proce-
dural changes. In all likelihood, the congressional reforms embodied in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act spell the end of habeas. In other
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